School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China
| Abstract: | At present, shared parking has become one of the main ways to solve the problem of "difficult parking" in cities. In order to promote the development of shared parking platforms and promote the shared parking industry, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model with travelers, parking space owners and shared parking platforms as the main body, discusses the impact of parking fees and service fees on the evolutionary equilibrium of shared parking platforms, provides suggestions for the formulation of charging standards for shared parking platforms, and carries out numerical simulation analysis on the model. The results show that the three evolution strategies influence each other; The change of parking fee and service fee has a great influence on the strategy choice of parking space owners. Reducing parking fees can increase travelers' willingness to use the shared platform and improve the speed at which the system reaches a stable state. According to the evolution ratio of the three parties, appropriately increasing the service fee charged by the platform can also improve the speed of the system to reach a stable state, and finally make the system reach the evolutionary equilibrium state of the shared parking platform opening, travelers and parking space owners using the shared parking platform, and promote the good development of the shared parking industry. |
| Keywords: | Shared Parking; Tripartite Evolutionary Game; Evolutionary Equilibrium |
| DOI: | 10.57237/j.wjms.2023.03.001 |
| 1. | 武汉科技大学大学生创新创业计划 (编号: 2022157) |
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