A Study on the Inhibitory Effect of the Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property on Corporate Short-sighted Managerial Behavior
Business School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, China
| Abstract: | At present, some corporate management teams exhibit short-sighted tendencies. They focus on short-term financial indicators rather than conducting in-depth research on long-term market trends. However, such an emphasis on immediate gains can lead to neglect of long-term strategic planning, missed opportunities, short-sightedness, damage to corporate reputation and competitiveness, and ultimately, developmental difficulties for their corporations. Previous studies emphasize the role of enhancing corporate capabilities and strengthening external supervision in curbing short-sighted managerial behavior, yet overlook the impact of institutional-level legal regulations on such behavior. From the perspective of transaction cost theory, this paper proposes establishing intellectual property courts as an institutional arrangement to strengthen the intellectual property judiciary, which may effectively inhibit short-sighted managerial behavior. This paper examines A-share listed corporations in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2022. The authors take the establishment of intellectual property courts in 2014 as an exogenous shock and employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) model to empirically test the impact of strengthened judicial protection of intellectual property on corporate short-sighted managerial behavior. The results show that judicial protection of intellectual property can effectively deter short-sighted managerial behavior. Mechanism analysis reveals that judicial protection of intellectual property can curb short-sighted managerial behavior by alleviating external financing constraints and enhancing government supervision. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that judicial protection of intellectual property can significantly inhibit short-sighted managerial behavior in state-owned and large-scale corporations. The findings of this study provide theoretical and practical value for corporate governance in addressing short-sighted managerial behavior. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property; Short-Sighted Managerial Behavior; Industry Regulatory Pressure; External Financing Constraints; DID Model |
| DOI: | 10.57237/j.ssrf.2025.05.002 |
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Received: 8 September 2025
Accepted: 19 October 2025
Published Online: 12 November 2025
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